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Abstract—The development of mobile cloud computing has
brought many benefits to mobile users as well as cloud service
providers. However, mobile cloud computing is facing some
challenges, especially security-related problems due to the grow-
ing number of cyberattacks which can cause serious losses. In
this paper, we propose a dynamic framework together with
advanced risk management strategies to minimize losses caused
by cyberattacks to a cloud service provider. In particular, this
framework allows the cloud service provider to select appropriate
security solutions, e.g., security software/hardware implementa-
tion and insurance policies, to deal with different types of attacks.
Furthermore, the stochastic programming approach is adopted
to minimize the expected total loss for the cloud service provider
under its financial capability and uncertainty of attacks and their
potential losses. Through numerical evaluation, we show that our
approach is an effective tool in not only dealing with cyberattacks
under uncertainty, but also minimizing the total loss for the cloud
service provider given its available budget.
Keywords- Cyber insurance, cybersecurity, cloud services,
mobile cloud, stochastic programming.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile cloud computing (MCC) is an emerging platform
using cloud computing to provide applications and services to
mobile users through mobile networks. By taking advantages
of cloud computing technology, mobile applications can be
performed more efficiently, thereby generating huge profits for
mobile users as well as cloud service providers (CSPs) [1].
Forbes magazine predicts that worldwide spending on public
cloud services will grow at a 19.4% compound annual growth
rate (CAGR) from nearly $70 billion in 2015 to more than
$141 billion in 2019. However, the development of MCCs
is facing with some security-related challenges due to the
growing of cyberattacks in the last few years. According to
US government statistics, the number of ransomware attacks
increased 300% from 2015, with over 4,000 attacks detected
per day in 2016 [2]. Hence, countermeasures and risk man-
agement solutions for cybercrime are urgently in need.
Although there are many security solutions implemented to
detect and prevent cyberattacks in MCC such as implementing
firewall and installing antivirus software, achieving complete
security protection is still nearly impossible [3]. Therefore,
cyber insurance has been emerging as an alternative approach
to address and manage cyber risks for cloud and computer
networks [4], [5]. Under cyber insurance coverage, when an
attack happens to a CSP, the CSP’s losses will be covered
partially or fully by the cyber insurance provider. In other
words, cyber risks of the CSP now are “transferred” to the
insurance provider through a cyber insurance contract. Thus,
the CSP’s risks can be mitigated significantly. However, cyber
insurance is not always the best solution for the CSP because
of the variety of attacks, the diversity of premiums and claims,
and the CSP’s limited budget. Hence, how to balance between
security and insurance policies given a limited budget and
under uncertainty of cyber threats is an important challenge.
In this paper, we propose a dynamic framework which can
utilize advantages of both security and insurance polices, and
it can be applied widely in cloud environment to deal with
cyber risks under uncertainty. This framework consists of two
decision stages. In the first stage, the CSP has to decide how
much it should invest to buy security packages to prevent
cyberattacks and how much it should spend to buy insurance
packages to cover losses caused by the attacks. The more
money the CSP invests into security packages, the higher
chance the cyberattacks can be successfully prevented, but the
less money the CSP can spend for insurance. Then, in the
second stage, the CSP observes actual attacks associated with
their direct losses, and makes a decision to whether implement
countermeasures to mitigate their indirect losses or not. To
address the multi-stage optimization problem under uncertainty
of attacks and a limited budget, we adopt the stochastic
programming method [6] to find optimal budget allocation
policies for the CSP. Through performance evaluation, we
demonstrate that the proposed approach can use efficiently an
available budget to minimize the total cost incurred by the
cyberattacks under uncertainty. We also show the efficiency
of using cyber insurance in dealing with cyber risks in MCC
through balancing budget allocation.
II. RELATED WORK
The rapid growth of cloud services together with high
security demands recently have brought a great opportu-
nity for cyber insurance providers. The first commercial cy-
ber insurance products were introduced by Cloudinsurnce
(http://www.cloudinsure.com) in 2013 to specifically address
emerging liabilities within the cloud environment. In partner-
ship with global insurance and reinsurance carriers, Cloudin-
surnce developed privacy and security liability coverage to
meet security demands of cloud service providers (CSPs).
Recently, MSPAlliance (http://www.mspalliance.com) in part-
nership with Lockton Affinity, the world’s largest privately
owned independent insurance broker, announced a new cloud
insurance service, called, Cloud and MSP Insurance [7].
This insurance may be included as part of a service level
agreement with the CSP. Alternatively, it may be purchased
separately through a third-party insurance company which
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works with the CSP. While Cloudinsurance and MSPAlliance
aim to provide insurance policies for CSPs, Cloudsurance
(http://www.cloudsurance.com) released in 2016 is the first
cyber cloud insurance package designed to offer financial
protection to cloud consumers. Cloudsurance offers a wide
range of cyber insurance services to cloud customers such as
data loss compensation, cyberattack protection, and urgent mi-
gration support. The emergence of Cloudsurance has made the
cyber insurance market more and more diverse and promising.
In the literature, applications of cyber insurance in the cloud
environment have also received a lot of attention. In particular,
the authors in [8] presented a taxonamy of cyber risks and
discussed risk management methods for cybersecurity insur-
ance in cloud computing. Findings in this paper can be used
as a reference for further research in cybersecurity insurance.
In [9], the authors proposed a secure cyber incident framework
to reduce cyber insurance costs without lowering down the
security level. To do so, the authors introduced an optimal
cost balance algorithm to achieve the highest cybersecurity
guarantee given a financial budget constraint. The numerical
results showed that cyber insurance is an effective way to
mitigate losses caused by cyberattacks for cloud providers.
Alternatively, there are some other work introducing appli-
cations of cyber insurance to deal with cyber risks for cloud
customers [10], [11]. The core idea of these papers is using
stochastic programming to balance provisioning of security
and insurance, even when future costs and risks are uncertain.
The authors demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed
solution through evaluation on real attack data.
Different from all aforementioned research works and others
in the literature, in this paper, we introduce a stochastic
programming framework to minimize the total cost for the
CSP. This framework not only utilizes advantages of security
and insurance policies, but also allows the CSP to implement
prompt countermeasures to mitigate indirect losses of cyber-
attacks under uncertainty and a limited budget.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
The system model is illustrated in Fig. 1. In this model,
the CSP provides cloud services/applications to its customers.
When the CSP provides services, it can suffer from cyberat-
tacks which can cause serious damages. There are K types
of attacks which can occur with different probabilities in the
business time. We denote A = {a1, . . . , ak, . . . , aK} as the
set of attacks which can occur simultaneously at the business
time with probabilities {p(a1), . . . , p(ak), . . . , p(aK)}, respec-
tively. Therefore, before the service period, the CSP can choose
to buy security packages to prevent cyberattacks which can
occur at the business time.
We assume that there are N security service providers (SPs),
and each SP provides K security packages to deal with K
types of attacks. The security package offered by SP-n to
prevent attack ak is denoted by sakn . Each s
ak
n costs c
ak
n , and
it can protect the CSP from attack ak with probability pakn .
Given the available budget and information of attacks (e.g.,
probabilities of attacks and their potential losses), the CSP
can choose optimal security packages to minimize the potential
loss. However, when attacks happen, the implemented security
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Fig. 1. System model.
solutions may not be able to prevent the attacks completely.
Thus, the CSP can choose to buy cyber insurance packages to
cover its services when cyber risks happen.
We assume that there are M cyber insurance providers (IPs),
and each IP offers K insurance packages for K types of at-
tacks. The insurance package offered by IP-m to cover the loss
caused by attack ak is denoted by iakm . Each i
ak
m has premium
rakm and covers q
ak
m % of the loss of attack ak. Here, there are
two types of losses, i.e., direct loss and indirect loss, with the
amounts denoted by dakg and ie(d
ak
g ), respectively. Direct loss
refers to a damage immediately inflicted by an attack (e.g.,
business interruption), while indirect loss refers to an indirect
effect of an attack (e.g., damage to company’s reputation).
For example, when a denial-of-service (DoS) attack happens,
customers cannot access cloud services, and this causes direct
loss to the CSP because there is no revenue from the customers
and the CSP must repair the system. If the repair time is too
long, the CSP’s reputation will be reduced, and thus the CSP
may lose the customers in the future.
Currently, cyber insurance packages offered by IPs, e.g.,
AIG (http://www.AIG.com) and Cloudsurance, cover only
direct losses such as data loss and downtime compensation.
Thus, in this paper, insurance packages of IPs are assumed to
cover only direct losses from cyberattacks. To mitigate indirect
losses, the CSP can adopt repair packages to make the system
back to work as soon as possible, thereby reducing indirect
losses of cyberattacks. These repair packages can be provided
by a third-party or by the CSP itself. We assume that there are
U repair packages from which the CSP can choose, and each
repair package u ∈ U = {1, . . . , U} is associated with a repair
package fee sdg,aku and a percentage of damage reduction if
we implement repair package u. We denote 1 − tdg,aku as
the percentage of indirect losses which can be reduced if we
implement repair package u for direct loss dg under attack
ak. The repair packages are especially useful in dealing with
cyberattacks with high indirect losses. However, due to the
limited budget and the diverse attacks and their losses, the
CSP needs to balance expenditure distribution to minimize its
total cost.
IV. STAGES, DECISION VARIABLES, AND UNCERTAINTY
The stochastic programming model under considerations
contains three stages, i.e., preparation, service, and assessment
stages, as illustrated in Fig. 2. At the first stage, the CSP
evaluates potential losses of cyberattacks which can happen
in the service stage, and makes decisions to buy security
and insurance packages to prevent cyberattacks and mitigate
their potential losses. Then, in the second stage, the CSP
observes the actual attacks and their direct losses, and selects
appropriate repair packages to prevent potential indirect losses.
Finally, at the last stage, the CSP assesses the actual total loss.
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Fig. 2. In each business time period, there are three stages.
A. Decision Variables
The solution of a stochastic optimization formulation is
known as a decision, and is represented by a set of values
assigned to the decision variables. In the considered system
model, there are three decision variables which are made in
the first two stages, i.e., preparation and service stages.
1) Preparation stage: In the preparation stage, the CSP has
to make two decisions (1) which security packages and (2)
which insurance packages should be purchased? If we denote
Xakn as the decision variable to buy security package n from
SPn to prevent attack ak and Y akm as the decision variable to
buy insurance package m from IPm to cover attack ak, then
we have:
Xakn ∈ {0, 1},∀ak ∈ A and ∀n ∈ N = {1, . . . , N},
Y akm ∈ {0, 1},∀ak ∈ A and ∀m ∈M = {1, . . . ,M},
(1)
where 1 is to express that the CSP agrees to buy, and 0
otherwise. Here, variables Xakn and Y
ak
m must satisfy the
following constraints:
Xakn ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ak ∈ A and n ∈ N ,
and
N∑
n=1
Xakn ≤ 1, ∀ak ∈ A.
(2)
Y akm ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ak ∈ A and m ∈M,
and
M∑
m=1
Y akm ≤ 1, ∀ak ∈ A.
(3)
K∑
k=1
N∑
n=1
Xakn c
ak
n +
K∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
Y akm r
ak
m ≤ B∗. (4)
The constraints in (2) and (3) are to ensure that each attack
is covered by at most one security provider and one insurance
provider, respectively. The constraint in (4) is to make sure that
the total expenditure of the CSP does not exceed the available
budget B∗.
2) Service stage: When an attack ak happens and is suc-
cessful, it can cause a direct loss dakg with probability p
dg
ak .
Here, we denote G as the total number of direct loss cases,
then we have:
G∑
g=1
pdgak = 1,∀ak ∈ A. (5)
When direct loss dakg happens, it will associate with indirect
loss ie(dakg ) with probability p
i
e(d
ak
g ). We denote E as the total
number of indirect loss cases, then we have:
E∑
e=1
pie(d
ak
g ) = 1,∀ak ∈ A and g ∈ G = {1, . . . , G}. (6)
If the direct loss dakg happens, the CSP can choose a repair
package to mitigate the indirect losses caused by the direct loss
dakg . We denote Z
dg,ak
u as the decision variable to implement
repair package u for direct loss dg under attack ak. Then, we
have the following constraints:
Zdg,aku ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ak ∈ A, u ∈ U and g ∈ G,
and
U∑
u=1
Zdg,aku ≤ 1, ∀ak ∈ A and ∀g ∈ G.
(7)
K∑
k=1
N∑
n=1
Xakn c
ak
n +
K∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
Y akm r
ak
m
+
K∑
k=1
U∑
u=1
G∑
g=1
Zdg,aku s
dg,ak
u ≤ B∗.
(8)
Here, the constraint in (7) is to ensure that each direct
loss caused by an attack is covered by at most one repair
package, and the constraint in (8) is to make sure that the
total expenditure of the CSP does not exceed the available
budget B∗.
3) Assessment stage: In the last stage, the CSP evaluates
the actual indirect losses and makes claims for direct losses
covered by the IPs.
B. Uncertainty of Parameters and Scenarios
The considered system contains a number of uncertain
parameters which are unknown in advance. In particular, the
number of cyberattacks in the second stage, direct losses
associated with each attack, and indirect losses of each attach
given an actual direct loss, are unknown at the first stage. The
number of attacks and their direct losses are only known in the
second stage. Similarly, the indirect loss of each attack is only
known in the third stage. We denote A and D as the set of
all possible attack scenarios and the set of all possible direct
loss scenarios associated with an attack, respectively. Let Ω†
represent the set of all possible scenarios in the second stage,
then Ω† = A ×D , where × is the Cartesian product. Similarly,
we denote I as the set of all possible indirect loss scenarios
in the last stage. Then, the set of all possible scenarios in the
last stage is Ω‡ = I .
V. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Stochastic Optimization Problem
To solve the problem, we adopt the stochastic programming
optimization technique with multi-stage decisions. The opti-
mization problem formulation is given in (9).
min
X
ak
n ,Y
ak
m ,Z
dg,ak
u
K∑
k=1
N∑
n=1
M∑
m=1
G∑
g=1
U∑
u=1
E∑
e=1
(
C1
(
Xakn , Y
ak
m
)
+EΩ†
[
C2
(
Xakn , Y
ak
m , Z
dg,ak
u , ω
†)
+EΩ‡
[
C3
(
Xakn , Y
ak
m , Z
dg,ak
u , ω
†, ω‡
)]])
,
(9)
s.t. (2), (3), (7), and (8).
The objective function in (9) aims to minimize the total cost
of CSP in all three stages. The expected costs of the second and
third stages are represented by EΩ† [·] and EΩ‡ [·], respectively.
Here, ω† ∈ Ω† and ω‡ ∈ Ω‡ are scenarios in the second and
third stages, respectively.
In (9), C1
(
Xakn , Y
ak
m
)
is an optimization problem to mini-
mize the total cost at the preparation stage, and it is defined
as follows:
C1
(
Xakn , Y
ak
m
)
=
min
X
ak
n ,Y
ak
m
(
K∑
k=1
N∑
n=1
Xakn c
ak
n +
K∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
Y akm r
ak
m
)
.
(10)
Given fixed values of decision variables Xakn and a scenario
in the second stage ω†, we minimize the total cost in the second
stage by:
C2
(
Xakn , Y
ak
m , Z
dg,ak
u , ω
†) = min
Z
ak,dg
u
( K∑
k=1
G∑
g=1
dakg (X
ak
n , ω
†)
+
K∑
k=1
U∑
u=1
G∑
g=1
Zdg,aku (X
ak
n , ω
†)sdg,aku
)
.
(11)
In (11), dakg (X
ak
n , ω
†) is the direct loss and Zdg,aku (Xakn , ω
†)
is the decision of the CSP given decisions Xakn (∀n ∈ N and
ak ∈ A) in the first stage and the scenario of attacks associated
with their direct losses in the second stage.
The total cost for the last stage is determined as follows:
C3
(
Xakn , Y
ak
m , Z
dg,ak
u , ω
†, ω‡
)
=
E∑
e=1
ie(X
ak
n , Z
dg,ak
u , ω
†, ω‡)−
K∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
Y akm (ω
†)qakm .
(12)
In (12), the first and second terms represent the indirect
loss and the claim of the CSP. Here, ie(Xakn , Z
dg,ak
u , ω†, ω‡)
is the indirect loss given decisions of the CSP made in the
first and second stages and actual scenarios of the second and
third stages. Y akm (ω
†)qakm is the actual claim of the CSP given
its decision to buy insurance in the first stage and the actual
scenario in the second stage.
B. Deterministic Equivalent Formulation
The aforementioned stochastic optimization formulation
above can be transformed into a deterministic equivalent
optimization formulation as follows [12]:
min
X
ak
n ,Y
ak
m ,Z
dg,ak
u
(
C1 + C2 + C3
)
,
s.t. (2), (3), (7), and (8),
(13)
where
C1 =
K∑
k=1
N∑
n=1
[
Xakn c
ak
n
]
+
K∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
[
Y akm r
ak
m
]
, (14)
C2 =
K∑
k=1
[
p(ak)
(
1−
N∑
n=1
Xakn p
ak
n
) G∑
g=1
pdgakd
ak
g
]
+
K∑
k=1
[
p(ak)
(
1−
N∑
n=1
Xakn p
ak
n
) G∑
g=1
(
pdgak
U∑
u=1
Zdg,aku s
dg,ak
u
)]
,
(15)
and C3 =
K∑
k=1
[
p(ak)
(
1−
N∑
n=1
Xakn p
ak
n
)
G∑
g=1
[
pdgak
(
1−
U∑
u=1
Zdg,aku t
dg,ak
u
) E∑
e=1
pie(d
ak
g )ie(d
ak
g )
]]
−
K∑
k=1
[
p(ak)
(
1−
N∑
n=1
Xakn p
ak
n
) G∑
g=1
pdgakd
ak
g
M∑
m=1
Y akm q
ak
m
]
.
(16)
Here, C1, C2, and C3 represent the expected costs in the
first, second, and third stages, respectively. In (16), the first
and second terms represent the indirect loss and the claim of
the CSP, respectively. If the CSP has purchased an insurance
package to cover losses caused by attack ak, the CSP can claim
the direct loss caused by this attack, and thus the actual direct
loss will be reduced by qakm %. Similarly, if the CSP has bought
the repair package to mitigate the indirect loss for attack ak,
the actual indirect loss will be reduced by (1− tgu(ak))%.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Experiment Setup
We consider two types of cyberattacks, e.g., data breaches
and DoS, that are among the top 5 cyber threats in cloud
environment [13]. Data breaches are the most frequent attack
in cloud computing and the number of data breach incidents
accounts for around 40% of the overall number of breaches
in 2016 [14]. Losses caused by data breaches are diverse and
they depend on many factors such as company size, the number
of exposed records, and types of exposed data [15]. Similarly,
losses and probabilities of DoS attacks are diverse and they can
be estimated based on some online support services, e.g., [16].
In this paper, we consider a cloud online service provider,
e.g., healthcare service provider, that is highly prone to cyber
risk [17] with a medium size. In the simulation, we set the
attack probability of data breaches at p(a2) = 0.4 and vary
the DoS attack probability to evaluate the performance. For
a medium-size service provider, the losses of DoS and data
breaches can be set in the range from $10,000 to $100,000.
TABLE I
PARAMETER SETTINGS
Attacks a1 a2
p(ak) 0.1 0.4
Direct loss d1 d2 d1 d2
p
dg
ak 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.8
d
ak
g 6.5 5.3 3.0 4.0
Indirect loss i1 i2 i1 i2 i1 i2 i1 i2
pie(d
ak
g ) 0.2 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.5
ie(d
ak
g ) 8.4 3.4 2.2 5.1 5.8 5.4 3.2 2.8
Repair r1 r2 r1 r2 r1 r2 r1 r2
t
dg,ak
u 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.8
s
dg,ak
u 1.1 1.9 1.1 1.9 1.1 1.9 1.1 1.9
TABLE II
THE SECURITY AND INSURANCE PACKAGE PARAMETERS
SP1 SP2 IP1 IP2
c
ak
n p
ak
n c
ak
n p
ak
n r
ak
m q
ak
m % r
ak
m q
ak
m %
a1 1.2 60% 1.8 80% 0.6 70% 0.9 90%
a2 1.4 60% 1.9 80% 0.8 70% 1.1 90%
Other parameters are provided in Table I. Note that we nor-
malize losses and fees in the range from $10,000 to $100,000
into 1 to 10 monetary units for presentation.
There are two security providers (SPs) and two insurance
providers (IPs). SP1 and IP1 provide basic services, while
SP2 and IP2 provide advanced services (i.e., higher fees with
higher protection and claims) for the CSP. For example, the
cost to implement Raptor Firewall NT v6.5 with virtual private
network and unlimited mobile users is around $18,000 [18],
while the implementation cost for the CoSoSys Endpoint
Protector-4 to prevent data loss starts at $8,250 [19]. Premiums
for healthcare Software-as-a-Service providers are estimated
around $10,000 [20]. Similar to Table I, fees in Table II are
normalized in the range of 1 to 10. Other parameters of the
SPs and IPs are given in Table II. The budget for security
policies of the CSP is limited at 5 monetary units.
B. Numerical Results
We first vary the probability of attack a1 and evaluate the
performance of the proposed solution. In Table III, we show
the security policy of the CSP to deal with the attacks, and
Fig. 3 shows the performance of the proposed solution when
the probability of attack a1, i.e., p(a1), increases. As shown
in Fig. 3(a), when the probability of attack a1 increases, the
potential loss caused by attack a1 (including its direct loss and
indirect loss) will be increased. Thus, the CSP will invest more
money to security solutions and insurance policies to mitigate
the potential loss of attack a1. However, the expenditure
distribution is dissimilar under different p(a1). As observed
in Table III, if the probability of attack a1 is lower than 0.5,
the CSP will buy an insurance package together with a repair
package to deal with attack a1. Nevertheless, if the probability
of attack a1 is greater than 0.5, the CSP will buy a security
package to prevent attack a1 at the first stage. The reason
can be explained through Fig. 3(a). When the probability of
attack a1 is lower than 0.5, its occurrence probability and
potential loss are not high, and thus the CSP can use insurance
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Fig. 3. (a) The expected costs of attacks and (b) the total expected cost when
the probability of attack a1 is varied.
and repair policies to mitigate the potential loss of attack a1.
However, when the probability of attack a1 is greater than
0.5, both its occurrence probability and potential loss are very
high. Hence, the CSP has to use a security package to prevent
attack a1 right at the first stage, thereby reducing both direct
and indirect losses in the next stages. Note that since the CSP
budget is limited at 5, the CSP has to balance among security,
insurance, and repair policies to minimize the expected total
cost. This is an important issue especially for limited-budget
companies in implementing countermeasures for cyberattacks.
In Fig. 3(b), we compare the performance of the proposed
solution in terms of the expected total cost with those of
other approaches when the probability of attack a1 is varied.
Specifically, we compare with three other optimization ap-
proaches, i.e., optimization approaches without using insurance
policies, without using security packages, and without using
both security and insurance policies. As the probability of
attack a1 increases, the expected total costs of all approaches
increase, and the cost obtained by the proposed solution is
always the lowest one. The results in Fig. 3 demonstrate
the importance in balancing between security and insurance
policies to help the CSP to mitigate cyberattacks.
We then set the probability of attack a1 at 0.4 and vary
the probability of direct loss d1 of attack a2 to evaluate its
impacts to the security policy of the CSP. In Table IV, when
the probability of direct loss d1 under attack a2, i.e., pd1a2 , is
lower than 0.5, the CSP will invest in security and insurance
packages. However, when pd1a2 is greater than 0.5, the CSP
only spends money for repair packages to prevent the potential
indirect loss of direct loss d1 under attack a2. The reason can
be explained through Fig. 4(a). In particular, in Fig. 4(a), as
pd1a2 increases, the potential loss of direct loss d1 together with
its indirect loss under attack a2 will be increased. However,
the total potential loss of attack a2 is slightly reduced because
under attack a2 the direct loss d1 is lower than direct loss
d2. Thus, instead of using security and/or insurance packages
which have higher costs, the CSP will choose only a repair
package to deal with direct loss d2 under attack a2 when
pd1a2 is high. In Fig. 4(b), we evaluate the performance of the
proposed solution by comparing its expected total cost with
those of other approaches. As pd1a2 increases from 0.1 to 0.5,
the expected total cost of the CSP slightly increases. However,
TABLE III
THE SECURITY POLICIES WHEN THE PROBABILITY OF ATTACK a1 IS VARIED
Probability of attack a1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Security policy of attack a1 0 IP1 IP2 IP2 IP2 SP2 SP2 SP2 SP2+IP1
(a1) Direct loss 1 0 0 Rep1 Rep1 Rep1 0 0 0 0
(a1) Direct loss 2 Rep1 Rep1 Rep1 Rep1 Rep1 Rep1 0 0 0
Security policy of attack a2 IP1 IP2 SP2 SP2 SP2 SP2 IP1 IP1 SP2
(a2) Direct loss 1 Rep2 Rep1 0 0 0 0 Rep1 Rep1 0
(a2) Direct loss 2 Rep1 Rep1 0 0 0 0 Rep1 Rep1 0
TABLE IV
THE SECURITY POLICIES WHEN THE DIRECT LOSS d1 OF ATTACK a2 IS VARIED
Probability of direct loss d1 under attack a2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Security policy of attack a1 IP2 IP2 IP2 IP2 IP2 IP2 IP2 IP2 IP2
(a1) Direct loss 1 Rep1 Rep1 Rep1 Rep1 0 0 Rep1 Rep1 Rep1
(a1) Direct loss 2 Rep1 Rep1 Rep1 Rep1 Rep1 Rep1 Rep1 Rep1 Rep1
Security policy of attack a2 IP1 SP2 SP2 SP2 IP1 IP1 0 0 0
(a2) Direct loss 1 0 0 0 0 Rep2 Rep2 Rep2 Rep2 Rep2
(a2) Direct loss 2 Rep1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Fig. 4. The overall network throughput of the secondary system in the RFPB-
CRN.
when pd1a2 keeps increasing from 0.5 to 0.9, the expected total
cost of the CSP slightly decreases. Again, the expected total
cost obtained by the proposed solution is always lower than
those of other approaches.
VII. SUMMARY
In this paper, we have developed a new framework based
on stochastic programming approach for the risk management
problem in mobile cloud environment. The aim of this frame-
work is to find the optimal tradeoff among security policies,
insurance policies, and countermeasures under uncertainty of
cyberattacks and their losses such that the expected total cost
of the cloud service provider is minimized. Through numerical
results, we have shown the effectiveness as well as flexibility
of the proposed solution in dealing with cyberattacks. The find-
ings in this paper are especially important not only for cloud
service providers in implementing security policies, but also
for security and insurance providers in proposing appropriate
offers to attract more customers. For the future work, we will
study the relation between security and insurance providers
through bundling strategies and matching theory. Furthermore,
the relation between a direct loss and its indirect losses will
be further investigated.
REFERENCES
[1] D. T. Hoang, et al., “A survey of mobile cloud computing: Architecture,
applications, and approaches,” Wireless Communications and Mobile
Computing, vol. 13, no. 18, pp.1587-1611, Dec. 2013.
[2] Ransomware attacks increase 300% in 2016, Business Insights, 2017.
[3] R. Pal, et al., “Will cyber-insurance improve network security? A market
analysis,” in IEEE INFOCOM, pp. 235-243, Toronto, Canada, May 2014.
[4] A. Marotta, et al., “Cyber-insurance survey,” Computer Science Review,
vol. 24, pp. 35-61, Feb. 2017.
[5] D. T. Hoang, et al., “Charging and discharging of plug-in electric
vehicles (PEVs) in vehicle-to-grid (V2G) systems: A cyber insurance-
based model,” IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 732-754, Jan. 2017.
[6] S. W. Wallace and W. T. Ziemba, eds. Applications of stochastic pro-
gramming. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2005.
[7] Cloud and MSP Insurance. Available online: https://mspalliance.com/
membership/cloud-msp-insurance/.
[8] S. A. Elnagdy, et al., “Understanding taxonomy of cyber risks for
cybersecurity insurance of financial industry in cloud computing,” in IEEE
International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing, pp.
295-300, Jun. 2016.
[9] K. Gai, et al., “A novel secure big data cyber incident analytics framework
for cloud-based cybersecurity insurance,” in IEEE International Confer-
ence on BigDataSecurity/HPSC/IDS, pp. 171-176, Apr. 2016.
[10] S. Chaisiri, et al., “A joint optimization approach to security-as-a-service
allocation and cyber insurance management,” in IEEE International
Conference on Trustcom/BigDataSE/ISPA, pp. 426-433, Aug 2015.
[11] J. Chase, et al., “A scalable approach to joint cyber insurance and
security-as-a-service provisioning in cloud computing,” IEEE Transac-
tions on Dependable and Secure Computing, July 2017.
[12] P. Kall, S. W. Wallace, and P. Kall. Stochastic programming. Chichester:
Wiley, 1994.
[13] Top 5 Cloud Security Threats. Available online: https://upside.tdwi.org/
articles/2017/06/09/top-5-cloud-security-threats.aspx.
[14] Data Breaches Increase 40 Percent in 2016. Available online: http://
www.idtheftcenter.org/2016databreaches.html.
[15] Mini Data Breach Cost Calculator. Available online: https://eriskhub.
com/mini-dbcc.
[16] DDoS Downtime Cost Calculator. Available Online: https://lp.incapsula.
com/ddos-downtime-cost-calculator.html.
[17] Cyber Risk for Healthcare Industry. http://www.aon.com/attachments/
risk-services/cyber/Cyber-Risk-for-Healthcare-22-Dec.pdf.
[18] Evaluating the cost of an enterprise firewall. http://www.techrepublic.
com/article/evaluating-the-real-cost-of-an-enterprise-firewall/.
[19] CoSoSys Endpoint Protector 4. Available Online: https://www.
scmagazine.com/cososys-endpoint-protector-4/review/6791/
[20] How much does Data Breach Cost? https://databreachinsurancequote.
com/cyber-insurance/cyber-insurance-data-breach-insurance-premiums/.
